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Introduction 
Due to its long history, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been reformed 
on several occasions, especially since 1992. 
Today, the CAP has turned into a multi-
functional policy, supporting market oriented 
agricultural production, while also contributing 
to the preservation of rural areas, and the 
protection of the environment for a 
sustainable production in the EU.  
Over the years, the weight given to the 
different goals has shifted, and sustainability 
has become a central objective of the EU. 
Accordingly, the instruments have changed. 
The policy has moved away from supporting 
market prices to supporting producer’s income 
and rural development while imposing rules 
for the protection of the environment. 
In October 2011, the European Commission 
presented its proposals to reform the CAP for 
the period 2014-2020. These proposals are in 
line with the previous reforms that have taken 
place since 1992. However, they have already 
triggered criticism from EU politicians and 
stakeholders, predicting a heated debate to 
come.  
Broadly speaking, there are three policy issues 
that have been and will continue to be relevant 
when discussing the Commission’s Proposals. 
These are: How to make the CAP more 
equitable, while maintaining its effectiveness? 
Following a seminar on the CAP post-
2013 held by Egmont - with the 
cooperation of the Polish Presidency - 
on the 25th of November 2011, Egmont 
commissioned the present policy brief.  
Three major policy issues were 
addressed at this occasion, namely; how 
to make the CAP more equitable, green 
and market-oriented? The trade-off 
between these policy issues will require 
policy choices that are worthy of 
analysis. 
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How to make the CAP greener, while 
remaining simple and competitive? And, how 
to make the CAP more market-oriented, while 
dealing with an increasing volatility in the 
markets? These three major policy issues have 
been addressed throughout three sessions of a 
seminar organised by Egmont - with the 
cooperation of the Polish presidency - on the 
25th of November 2011. Following the 
interesting and genuine discussions held under 
the Chatham House Rules on this occasion, 
Egmont has commissioned the present policy 
brief.  
An equitable CAP1 
Background 
During the last decade and a half, the CAP’s 
share in the EU budget has decreased from 
70% in the 80s to 40% today. However, as 
the policy remains by far the first beneficiary 
of EU funds, the net financial balances 
among countries are a permanent source of 
tensions. The promotion of national interests 
rather than the European public interest 
undermines the EU negotiations.  
Currently, the system is clearly not equitable. 
Most often, rich countries/regions and large 
farms get higher payments. About 80% of 
support goes to 20% of farmers, who most of 
the time do not need it as they are the biggest 
and wealthiest landowners.  
Only the historical developments and the 
political economy of the CAP can explain this 
situation. Since 1992, the CAP has 
progressively moved from a market support to 
                                                
1 This section is mostly inspired by the 
presentations of Andrzej BABUCHOWSKI 
(Minister Counsellor, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Permanent Representation of Poland) and Louis-
Pascal MAHÉ (Professor Emeritus, Agrocampus 
Rennes) given at the Egmont’s CAP seminar on 
the 25th of November. 
a direct income support by decoupling it 
(making it independent of production). The 
generalisation of the principle of decoupling 
was embodied in the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPS), which - as its name indicates - 
distributes the same payment to farmers 
whatever the production or the sales price. 
This subsidy is implemented via several 
models; the ‘historic’ model based on the 
amounts received between 2000 and 2002, the 
‘regional’ model based on a payment per 
hectare in the same region, or a ‘hybrid’ 
combination of the two. In the new Member 
States, a simplified scheme called the single 
area payment system (SAPS) is applied. The 
most common approach in the EU-15 is the 
one based on historical references, which has 
led to important disparities in the distribution 
of funds between Member States, farmers, 
regions and types of production.  
Direct payments have therefore lost most of 
their original legitimacy. As we have to go 
towards a more equitable policy, we can 
wonder what are the arguments for 
convergence towards more uniform payments 
and what lies behind the notion of equity.  
The arguments for convergence are fair 
competition across the single market and 
sustainability through a reward for public 
goods procurement in rural areas. In both 
cases opportunity costs and relative costs 
should be taken into account so as to 
acknowledge the different circumstances. 
Behind the notion of equity lies the notion of 
fairness and behind fairness, the notion of 
justice. For centuries, philosophers tried to 
define the notion of justice but they could not 
agree on much more that justice is treating 
people equally when the circumstances are 
identical. Agricultural producers face very 
heterogeneous cost situations across the EU 
due to the very different economic and natural 
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conditions. Therefore, equal distribution of 
payments does not necessarily mean the same 
as an equitable distribution. If the main 
objective of pillar 1 payments is really income 
support, then reducing income inequality 
should be about giving more to relatively 
poorer farmers. The future CAP should take 
greater account of the wealth and diversity of 
agriculture in the EU through a fair 
distribution of funds at all levels.  
More equity  among Member States?  
In terms of convergence across Member 
States, the Commission has examined objective 
criteria to determine the financial allocation 
between Member States. A selection will have 
to be made among these objective criteria, 
including, among others, GDP per capita, the 
amount of Agricultural Work Units (AWU) or 
gross value added in agriculture/AWU or 
other environmental criteria. While some 
countries favour the GDP per capita criterion, 
some others like Poland prefer the amount of 
AWU criterion, which benefits big landowners. 
The Commission has realised that any of the 
criteria would lead to a very substantial 
redistribution of the direct payments budget 
across Member States, undermining the 
balance in overall EU budget allocation 
between Member States. Therefore, despite the 
request of some Eastern Countries for a full 
alignment of direct payments across the EU, 
the convergence process will take longer. The 
Commission has envisaged that all countries 
with direct payments below 90% of the EU-27 
average will, over the period 2014-2020, close 
one-third of the gap between their current 
level and 90% of the EU average direct 
payments. For the Member States that 
currently receive more than the EU average, 
the contribution for balancing the level of 
payments across the EU-27 is proposed to be 
between around 1 and 7%. According to 
several participants to the seminar, this 
proposition can be seen as an attempt to widen 
the path dependency of Member States on the 
CAP. On the one hand, by taking not enough 
among Member States receiving more than the 
EU average direct payments, the path 
dependency of these countries will remain. On 
the other hand, by giving just enough to 
Member States who are unhappy with their 
financial allocation, new paths dependency will 
be created, leading to an even broader political 
impulse behind the policy.   
The proposals have also introduced an element 
of co-financing between the EU and Member 
States to reduce the differences of payments 
among Member States. The Member States 
that receive less than 90% of the EU average 
for direct payments would be allowed to 
transfer up to 5% of their rural development 
funds under Pillar 2 to Pillar 1, which provides 
direct income payments. Meanwhile, all 
Member States could channel up to 10% of 
their national envelope under pillar 1 to their 
rural development funds under pillar 2.  
A generalization of co-financing in both the 
CAP’s first and second pillars has been 
proposed by a participant in order to reduce 
the obsession of Member States with the net 
financial return of their contribution and to 
induce financial responsibility among national 
governments. However, co-financing induces a 
decision-making power for Member States. 
The latter could create distortions of 
competition due to the capability or political 
will of some Member States to co-finance 
more than others, particularly in the current 
situation created by the debt crisis. 
More equity  among farmers? 
The Commission’s proposals introduce a new 
‘Basic Payment Scheme’ that should be applied 
across the EU-27 as from 2014 in order to 
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move towards a uniform payment per hectare 
inside each region by 2019. This single scheme 
will allow moving away from the different 
models under the Single Payments Scheme 
(SPS) in the EU-15 and the Single Area 
Payments Scheme (SAPS) in most of the EU-
12. This Basic Payment Scheme based on the 
current regional model will reduce the 
differences of support among farmers and 
types of production but also among Member 
States and regions. Member States applying the 
‘historic’ model will have to calculate 50% of 
their basic payment on a uniform basis in 2014 
to attain a fully uniform payment by 2019.  
The Basic Payment Scheme will be 
complemented by a series of additional 
payments funded under the direct payments 
national envelope. These include a mandatory 
green payment of 30% of the national 
envelope to farmers following agricultural 
practices favourable to the climate and the 
environment; a special small farmers’ scheme 
that could represent up to 10% of the national 
envelope; a mandatory additional payment to 
new young farmers (under the age of 40) that 
could reach up to 2% of the national envelope 
and, a voluntary additional payment that could 
represent up to 5% of the national envelope 
for farmers in disadvantaged areas. Some 
countries, such as Poland, consider that 
Member States with small national envelopes 
will not be able to adequately compensate their 
farmers for the requirements imposed under 
the green payment. For instance, a Latvian 
farmer who receives an average direct payment 
of about €95 per year will not receive the same 
amount of money as a Dutch famer who 
receive an average direct payment of about 
€458 per year2, under the same requirements to 
                                                
2 European Commission, Annex 3: Direct payments 
in Impact Assessment, Common Agricultural 
Policy towards 2020, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Brussels, 20 October 2011. 
get the green payment. Many Eastern countries 
also consider that there is no reason to support 
young farmers. In countries with a small 
number of young farmers and a large national 
envelope, these young farmers will receive 
much higher payments than in countries with a 
large number of young farmers and a small 
national envelope. One can therefore wonder, 
like some participants did, whether this 
proposal is not creating even more situations 
of inequity. 
The Commission also intends to cap direct 
income support for the very large farms that 
benefit from economies of scale. Direct 
payments will be progressively capped starting 
from €150,000 - with a maximum threshold 
for payments of €300,000 per year. However, a 
part of the salary and social security costs can 
be deducted from the total amount, making 
capping only applicable to a very little number 
of large farms. Therefore, most participants 
shared the view that, despite the apparent 
argument of equity, capping will have more a 
symbolic than actual meaning.  
A restriction of payments to ‘active’ farmers 
has also been proposed. It should exclude 
“sofa farmers”, such as landowners of golf 
fields or airports, from support. The definition 
of an active farmer is however rather broad. 
EU aid would still be given to farmers whose 
income from non-agricultural activity 
represents less than 95% of their annual 
revenue. This questionable formula is mainly 
due to the fact that the Commission had to 
find a definition which respects WTO rules 
and does not link support to production. 
However, we can question the granting of 
public funds to someone who derives only 6% 
of its total income from farming. 
In conclusion, it remains questionable whether 
the Commission’s proposals regarding the 
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design of the direct payments scheme will 
significantly change the unfair allocation of 
payments to beneficiaries. Given the CAP’s 
history and the overall EU budget allocation, it 
has been observed that the distribution of the 
CAP’s funds among Member States and 
farmers goes beyond the simple argument of 
equity. Although the Commission’s proposals 
have introduced a system of convergence to 
reduce income differences between the old and 
new Member States, this convergence will take 
time, as it will only be partially achieved by 
2019. Moreover, the issue of internal 
disparities among farmers has barely been 
addressed. The proposal of phasing out the 
historic references used to calculate direct 
payment is a positive element. However, while 
many eastern countries request the 
abandonment of the historic model - which is 
no longer legitimate - from 2014 on, part of 
direct support should still be based on these 
historical references until 2019. The four other 
Commission’s proposals – the special scheme 
for small farmers, the additional support for 
new young farmers, the capping of payments 
and the aid focused on active farmers – are 
actually very modest. Besides, the proposals of 
capping support and focusing aid only on 
active farmers have already faced strong 
opposition from several members in the 
Council of ministers. In the middle and long 
term, a legitimate solution should be to reach a 
certain level of convergence across regions 
facing similar macro economic conditions. It 
would allow treating farmers equally when the 
circumstances are very similar.  
A greener CAP3 
Background 
The key question facing agriculture today is 
how to produce more in a more sustainable 
way, protecting water and soil, enhancing 
biodiversity and combating climate change. In 
the last decade and a half, the CAP has 
increasingly developed its greening measures. 
In pillar 1, direct payments have become 
subordinated to the respect of cross-
compliance to environmental requirements and 
standards of good agricultural and 
environmental practices. In pillar 2, the rural 
development policy has put emphasis on the 
preservation of rural environment and land 
management.   
The central element of the Commission’s 
proposals is greening.  The idea is to link direct 
payments with the delivery of public goods 
such as the countryside, biodiversity, water 
quality, the fight to counter climate change, 
etc. The idea of being of use to the public 
would restore part of the lost legitimacy of 
CAP’s direct support. However, greening has 
its limits. In order to become a real added 
value for the European agriculture, it has to be 
properly balanced so as not to lead to 
additional costs and complexity and therefore 
undermining the sector’s competitiveness. In 
their current form, the added value of the 
measures proposed to make the CAP greener 
can be questioned.  
                                                
3 This section is mostly inspired by the 
presentations of Poul Skytte CHRISTOFFERSEN 
(Former Head of Cabinet of Commissioner 
Fischler, European Commission) and Alain-
Dominique QUINTART (Head of Government & 
Public Affairs EAME, Syngenta) given at the 
Egmont’s CAP seminar held on the 25th of 
November. 
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The green ‘ condit ional i t i es ’  o f  d irec t  support  
The Commission’s proposals maintain the 
subordination of support to the respect of 
cross-compliance requirements and standards 
of good agricultural and environmental 
practices. This cross-compliance system should 
be slightly simplified by reducing the number 
of requirements. Moreover, some changes are 
envisaged, including the addition of the Water 
Framework and Sustainable Use of Pesticides 
directives. 
The most important and innovative change 
proposed by the Commission is the green 
payment, making 30% of the CAP’s direct 
payments national envelope conditional on 
three “greening” measures: 
• Diversifying cultivation: farmers have to 
grow at least three different crops 
simultaneously, two of which must 
represent at least 5% of the arable land 
and the third one must not exceed 70%; 
• Maintaining permanent pasture at the 
2014 level of the individual farm; 
• Maintaining an “ecological focus area” of 
at least 7% of farmland (excluding 
permanent grassland) via field margins, 
hedges, trees, fallow land, landscape 
features, biotopes, buffer strips, and 
forested area. 
Although it is generally explained that the 
greening measures would be compulsory for 
Member States but voluntary for farmers to 
accept, the proposal requires that the farmer 
who wants to remain eligible for the basic 
payment must also comply with the greening 
measures, turning them into a form of 
conditionality.  
These greening actions are meant to deliver 
environmental public goods. However, as long 
as the implementing measures are not known, 
the real added value of the CAP’s green 
payment will be difficult to assess.  
The first aspect of the greening rules relates to 
crop diversification. This measure is very 
attractive but will greatly depend on the way it 
is enforced. Crop diversification can be 
interpreted in different ways. For instance, 
should winter and summer wheat be 
considered as two different crops? Although 
most farmers already diversify their cultivation, 
it might prove difficult to implement in certain 
areas where soil and climate conditions work 
against the principle of crop diversification.  
The implementation of mandatory set-aside 
areas entails important transitions risks. To 
ensure the effect of maintaining permanent 
grassland at the 2014 level, it must be ensured 
that farmers are not able to plough up existing 
pasture and rent new grassland (which cannot 
be used for any other purpose) in order to 
comply with the requirement. Farmers could 
also plough up existing grassland in order to 
create scope for increasing the grassland once 
the reform will enter into force. 
The third aspect of the greening measures, 
requiring that farmers devote 7% of their 
eligible land for ecological purposes, is at first 
sight the most interesting. However, on closer 
examination one finds that the proposal does 
not specify how farmers should manage this 
ecological focus area of their land. In the 
absence of a framework for landscape 
management, this ecological focus area could 
not be maintained on the same surface each 
year. Yet, to enhance biodiversity, such areas 
need to be actively maintained for longer 
periods of time. Moreover, creating 
ecological/biodiversity corridors throughout 
Europe presupposes that these areas are 
connected and not scattered around the farms.  
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In order to incentivise farmers to sustainably 
intensify the quantity and the quality of 
agriculture production in Europe, innovation 
and new technologies are essential. In 
agriculture, the use of technology is not 
necessarily seen as part of the ‘greening’ 
concept, which is perhaps a missed 
opportunity. Syngenta – an agri-business 
committed to research and innovation - 
proposes therefore to include in the greening 
measures for direct payment the recognition of 
innovative practices and technologies that 
provide a better use of energy, water, soil, or 
stimulate biodiversity or carbon fixation.  
The green payment ’s  impacts  
The excellent idea of delivering public goods 
via the green payment may well be counter-
balanced by an increase of the costs of farming 
in the EU and a failure to stimulate the desired 
change in agriculture practices. Moreover, an 
additional control system to the already 
existing control of cross-compliance will be 
needed. The policy will need to strike the right 
balance between simplicity and efficiency.  
The costs of farming are expected to increase 
directly through a heavier administrative 
burden on farmers and indirectly through a 
loss of income in the short term. According to 
the Commission’s impact assessment, the cost 
of greening will amount to €33 per hectare of 
potentially eligible area (assuming about 160 
million ha) in 2020 or a total cost of about €5 
billion to EU farmers.4   
The most controversial greening measure is 
the 7% of mandatory set-aside area. Demand 
                                                
4 European Commission, Greening – Results of 
partial analysis on impact on farm income using 
FADN in Annex 2D, Impact Assessment, 
Common Agricultural Policy Towards 2020, Staff 
Working Paper, Brussels, 20 October 2011.  
for agricultural products is likely to rise in the 
future due to the population increase, dietary 
changes and the use of land for biofuels. 
Converting cultivatable land to permanent 
green grass could therefore not only reduce the 
overall production but also have a global 
environmental impact through increased 
imports. Nevertheless, the Commission argues 
that out of the 7% of set-aside area, there is 
already 4-5% that is not used by farmers and 
would qualify for this measure. With regard to 
the crop diversification, it may lead to price 
increases for the main arable crops, weakening 
the competitiveness of some products. 
A participant underlined that there is no real 
economic incentive for farmers to change 
behaviour and become greener. The green 
payment is in most cases just enough or not 
enough to cover the additional costs and 
income foregone resulting from the greening 
measures. Demonstration farms from Syngenta 
throughout Europe have nevertheless already 
proved that it was relatively easy to provide 
environmental goods while being profitable. 
Although many Member States are very much 
in favour of greening, they question the added 
value of the measures proposed by the 
Commission. Most of the time these measures 
do not suit their agricultural conditions, 
affecting their competitiveness. These 
countries would like to see more flexibility 
introduced in the proposals in order to have 
more tailor-made measures according to the 
situation of the regions. Flexibility is of course 
always very tempting. However, it also gives 
more room for loopholes. There is a risk that 
some Member States would exploit it, while 
others would not be able or would not like to 
do it. This would create distortions of 
competition and unfair situations. There is 
thus a big dilemma lying there. 
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Ultimately, one can wonder - like one 
participant - whether it would not have been 
possible to incorporate the greening measures 
in the cross-compliance scheme. It would have 
been the opportunity to simplify and 
streamline the cross-compliance system, in 
particular the part linked to the observance of 
good agricultural practice. Besides, with greater 
clarity, it would also have been possible to be 
more tough on sanctions. 
The second pi l lar ’s  ro le  
Over the past ten years, the EU’s rural 
development policy co-financed with Member 
States under Pillar 2 has grown much more 
rapidly than the first, playing an essential role 
in greening the CAP. However, it is now 
decreasing, which is not encouraging for 
environment. This Rural Development policy 
creates the legal framework in which Member 
States design their Plan for farmers, according 
to each country’s national specificities and 
giving more flexibility to tailor the needed 
solutions.  
The Commission proposes to introduce new 
rural development priorities in line with the 
Europe 2020 Strategy instead of the four 
current axes. These priorities are: fostering 
knowledge and innovation in agriculture and 
forestry; enhancing competitiveness; 
promoting food chain organisation and risk 
management; restoring, preserving and 
enhancing ecosystems (biodiversity, water 
management and soil management); promoting 
resource efficiency and the transition towards a 
low carbon and climate resilient economy; and 
realising the job’s potential and development 
of rural areas.  
Two of these priorities clearly support the 
preservation of rural areas, the protection of 
the environment and the fight against climate 
change. Member States will have to continue 
to give at least 25% of their Pillar 2 budget for 
issues related to the environment. However, 
the system does not favour projects focused 
on these issues as much as before. In the CAP 
Heath Check, the Commission used to give 
75% of co-financing to these issues.  
Fostering knowledge and innovation is a rural 
development priority that could also play a key 
role for the environment. The proposals for a 
substantial increase in the R&D budget 
dedicated to agricultural innovation and a new 
European innovation partnership, as well as 
the emphasis on the transfer of agricultural 
knowledge to the farmers are therefore 
generally welcomed. However, in order for 
innovation to play an important role in 
sustainable agriculture, the regulatory 
framework should be largely improved.   
 
In conclusion, the idea of greening the CAP is 
excellent, but – as it currently stands in the 
proposals – it might well reduce productivity, 
increase the administrative, regulatory, and 
financial burden on farmers, without actually 
producing any real benefits for the 
environment. Striking the right balance 
between competitiveness and environmental 
public-goods will require a policy choice. For 
some Member States, the provisions under 
pillar II for agri-environment measures 
already provide appropriate and flexible 
mechanisms to strike the right balance. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a close look 
at the greening proposals and the way they 
will be implemented in order to assess 
whether they answer to the central question in 
agriculture today; how to increase production 
in a sustainable way.  
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A market-oriented CAP5 
Background 
To better grasp the ideas put forward on how 
to make the CAP more market-oriented, it is 
important to understand how agriculture must 
be publically perceived. Agriculture must be 
considered; on the one hand, as a business 
seeking to get its returns from the market, and, 
on the other hand, as a policy for all citizens, 
ensuring we are using our common resources 
effectively by the delivery of public goods. In 
order to be politically acceptable for taxpayers, 
the CAP has to respect these two aspects of 
agriculture and show real benefits in the use of 
public money. The Commission’s proposal for 
the next Multi-annual Financial Framework is 
to allocate €435 billion to the CAP. This is 
equivalent to €1970 per second spent on the 
CAP for the next seven years. Many countries 
believe that such an amount still represents too 
big a share in the EU budget comparing to 
other EU priorities. Conversely, the 
Commission defends that when comparing the 
vast sums of public money spent in other 
sectors, the CAP is fairly cheap considering the 
services it renders to society.  
Key objectives of the CAP reform are ensuring 
continued and enhanced market focus and 
increasing competitiveness and productivity of 
EU agriculture. During the subsequent reforms 
since 1992, the amount of support provided 
through market intervention measures has 
gradually been reduced and replaced by a direct 
income support linked to cross-compliance 
                                                
5 This section is mostly inspired by the 
presentations of Tim RENDER (Counselor 
Agriculture and Regions, Permanent 
Representation of the UK to the EU) and 
Hermanus VERSTEIJLEN (Director, Agricultural 
markets, DG AGRI, European Commission) 
given at the Egmont’s CAP seminar held on the 
25th of November. 
requirements. This has allowed a convergence 
between internal and external market prices, 
making the EU quite competitive in most of 
the agricultural products on the world market. 
For some products, market support remains 
but only up to a low safety net level. The 
Commission’s proposals maintain this current 
market orientation. 
Towards a more market -or iented CAP 
In order to develop a competitive EU 
agriculture, there is a need for structural 
change. The key factors that can help farm 
businesses to respond to this need are; 
investing in physical infrastructure that can 
enhance productivity and human capital, 
improving the skills and knowledge of 
employees and managers, stimulating 
innovation and the use of technology, and 
favouring genuine competition to stimulate 
enterprise. These elements request behavioral 
changes that could be stimulated through 
public policy. Many elements of the CAP 
reform proposals are going in that direction. 
With milk quotas and wine planting rights 
already set to expire, the Commission is 
looking to end the last remaining quota regime 
for sugar. The current system limiting national 
sugar production and setting minimum prices 
should expire by 30 September 2015, 
accompanied by reductions in import tariffs.   
Following the analysis that the Commission 
made of the milk sector, it came out that 
efforts should be made to reinforce the 
bargaining power of farmers in the food chain. 
These efforts include promoting the use of 
written contracts and facilitating the formation 
of producer organisations in sectors other than 
fruit and vegetable where they have already 
played a role. Currently, the recognition of 
these producer organisations is left to the 
discretion of Member Sates. The proposal 
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obliges Member States to recognise them as 
long as they comply with the Commission’s 
criteria. Closer cooperation between farm 
businesses could allow farmers to gain 
efficiencies of scale and to share resources, 
helping with physical infrastructure investment 
issues.  
In that context, the Commission also proposes 
to derogate from normal competition law for 
the milk sector in order to strengthen the 
bargaining power of milk producers. Producer 
organisations representing dairy farmers will be 
able to negotiate contract terms, including 
prices, for some or all of their members. The 
share of national milk production controlled 
by a producer organisation will not be allowed 
to exceed 33% of total national production. 
However, it is likely that these producer groups 
will take some time to get their farmers to 
agree on prices. According to the proposal, the 
contract terms negotiated by these producer 
groups could also be made compulsory by 
Member States. This runs the risk of bringing 
back volume control in the milk sector. In 
some Member States, the prices based on this 
volume control could be higher than in others, 
damaging the internal market. A very careful 
discussion should be held in the Council of 
Ministers and the Parliament on this matter. 
Both more food and agriculture R&D and 
better ways of transferring the knowledge from 
researchers to farmers are key to boosting 
innovation and competitiveness. The 
Commission’s proposal to boost the available 
research budget is therefore more than 
welcome. Moreover, the new European 
Innovation Partnership approach should offer 
a new way of tackling the difficult issue of 
technology transfer.  
Going further? 
Some countries, particularly the UK, consider 
that the Commission missed the opportunity 
to begin a journey away from subsidy 
dependency. According to them, the current 
levels of direct support reduce the need to 
grow competitiveness and productivity, leading 
to a sub-optimal use of economic resources.  
The direct support levels issue is a very 
sensitive one. As food producer and provider 
of public goods, the amount of public money a 
farmer should get depends on one’s point of 
view. These subsidies are very important for 
net farm incomes. In the milk and cereal 
sectors, the direct support share of the net 
family income can range from 60 to 100%, 
depending on the market situation. The 
removal of direct support would therefore lead 
to a large decrease in the number of farmers.  
Is the proposed safe ty -net  suf f i c i ent? 
The Commission has proposed to revise the 
existing systems of public intervention and 
private storage aid – used as safety nets to help 
producers in times of market difficulty – to 
make it more responsive and more efficient. A 
new safeguard clause is also to be introduced 
to enable the Commission to take emergency 
measures in response to market disturbances, 
such as the one caused by the e-coli crisis in 
May-July 2011. These emergency measures 
should be paid from a new Special Reserve 
with an annual ceiling of €500 million to be 
mobilised in case of crises.  
As price volatility will become an increasingly 
regular phenomenon, there are doubts on 
whether these instruments will be sufficient. 
While Poland would like to see new proposals 
to minimize the risks, the UK would rather 
prefer a more limited safety-net.   
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In a nutshell, enhancing competitiveness is 
vital for the long-term future of the EU 
agriculture. A lot of things can be done but 
opportunities will need to be seized by 
Member States and farmers. During these past 
years, the CAP has known a big reduction in 
its budget and a decrease in the transfer of EU 
consumers to farmers. This has been the price 
to pay to keep the EU market open. Therefore, 
as rightly stated by a participant, the first 
priority is an open market; the second is a 
continued budgetary support from the EU and 
finally, if something remains to be given, to 
accept a certain level of direct payments.  
Conclusions 
In 2013, the CAP will open a new chapter in 
its long history of reforms. It is already clear 
that with the Commission’s proposals on the 
table this new chapter will not be 
revolutionary, but it will surely follow the slow 
forward looking trend of the previous reforms. 
Compromises are starting to emerge on some 
issues. However, on the most sensitive ones, 
there is still a lot of work to do. The CAP is a 
multi-functional policy developed on the basis 
of different collective objectives. These 
different objectives imply both 
complementarities and trade-offs. It is clear 
that, with its history, it is difficult for the CAP 
to be more equitable, while remaining 
effective. As for the greening of the CAP, it 
will require trade-offs if it also has to remain 
simple and competitive. In terms of 
complementarities, R&D and innovation are 
key areas to encourage. Not only can they 
boost competitiveness but also deliver better 
environmental results.  Finally, maintaining the 
market orientation of the CAP, while dealing 
with an increasing volatility in the markets also 
implies a policy-choice on the suitable level of 
public intervention in case of crises.    
Considering the trade-offs to be made, it must 
be acknowledged that the Commission’s 
proposals are a good basis for further 
negotiations as they already strike a pretty 
good balance between the different objectives 
at stake.  
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